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383 
FOREWORD 
Megan J. Hertzler† 
As I am typing the foreword on my laptop, effortlessly editing 
it without spilling ink from a fountain pen or filling a trash bin with 
crumpled paper, I take a moment to absorb how technology has 
transformed the world over the past century. Evolving at an ever-
faster pace, technology has both given us superpowers and 
rendered us vulnerable by making our resulting dependence an 
Achilles’ heel. The tension between functionality and dependency 
affects each one of us. For example, when on a road trip I do not 
bring a map, but rather I trust my smartphone to direct me to my 
destination. But when the reception for my smartphone—and the 
technology—is lost, so am I. 
In my professional life, focused on information governance in 
the utility industry, I am following with cautious enthusiasm the 
development of one of the most promising technologies on the 
horizon, the Smart Grid.1 Similar to other recent advances in 
technology, the Smart Grid is a vision of a future where billions of 
digital devices and machines of all kinds will communicate with 
each other to automate tasks and, we hope, improve our lives.2 
 
        †   Director of Information Governance at Xcel Energy, a combination 
electricity and natural gas utility company operating in eight midwestern states 
(www.xcelenergy.com). The Information Governance department at Xcel Energy 
is responsible for policy, strategy, and compliance for protecting Xcel Energy’s 
high-risk and high-value data. Ms. Hertzler is also a 1997 graduate of William 
Mitchell College of Law. 
 1.  The “Smart Grid” generally refers to advanced technology for the 
delivery of electricity that utilizes computer-based remote control and automation. 
An important aspect of this technology is the use of two-way communication 
technology and computer processing. For further definition of the “Smart Grid,” 
see Smart Grid, U.S. DEPT. ENERGY, http://energy.gov/oe/technology-development 
/smart-grid (last visited Dec. 21, 2013), and SMART GRID LIBR., http://www 
.smartgridlibrary.com (last visited Dec. 21, 2013). 
 2.  Steve Lohr, A Messenger for the Internet of Things, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 
2013), 2013 WLNR 10079927; see Dave Evans, Thanks to IoE, the Next Decade Looks 
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Some estimate that in less than a decade this interconnectivity will 
involve as many as thirty-seven billion intelligent devices, all 
connected and communicating.3 Consumers already use mobile 
phones to monitor home security,4 adjust thermostats, change 
television channels,5 unlock cars,6 and remotely report a person’s 
vital signs to their physicians for monitoring.7 These connected 
devices communicate on multiple levels, both overtly and covertly. 
In the process, they also collect unimaginable volumes of data—
both needed and not needed, harmless and highly sensitive. This 
data will flow to a wide range of recipients, including government 
agencies, corporations, researchers, health care providers, or even 
other consumers, who can then measure how even the most 
mundane of activities compares with that of others. These data 
trails have become our fingerprints, the record of personal and 
corporate decisions, and a permanent memorial to both our 
successes and mistakes. 
Technology empowers us in ways that were unimaginable a few 
generations before, and our dependence on it also creates new 
vulnerabilities. When this tension creates a rupture between the 
individual’s empowerment and the vulnerabilities of technology 
use, the ensuing disputes often land in courts. And thus, the courts 
take on the task of untangling the interplay between technology 
and fundamental issues of privacy, data security, government 
jurisdiction, and litigation risk. 
This is not a new issue. For example, when the media began to 
more widely use the “snap” camera in the 1880s, some perceived it 
as a threat to personal privacy. Then-future Supreme Court Justice 
Louis Brandeis lamented in 1890: 
 
Positively ‘Nutty,’ CISCO BLOGS (Feb. 12, 2013, 3:19 PM), http://blogs.cisco.com/ioe 
/thanks-to-ioe-the-next-decade-looks-positively-nutty. 
 3.  Evans, supra note 2. 
 4.  See, e.g., Eugene Kim, AT&T Digital Life Promises Whole Home 
Connectivity, PCMAG (Apr. 26, 2013, 9:57 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2 
/0,2817,2418196,00.asp.  
 5.  See, e.g., Glen Fleishman, Thanks to Smartphone Apps, Old Remote Control 
Becoming Remote, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 18, 2013), http://seattletimes.com/html 
/businesstechnology/2020148809_ptechpracticalmacxml.html. 
 6.  See, e.g., John D. Sutter, How to Unlock a Car with a Text Message, CNN.COM 
(Aug. 3, 2011, 5:21 PM), available at LEXIS. 
 7.  See, e.g., Pamela Lewis Dolan, Patients Expected to Use Smartphones for Health 
Monitoring, AM. MED. NEWS (Feb. 20, 2013), available at LEXIS. 
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[P]hotographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded 
the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and 
numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the 
prediction that “what is whispered in the closet shall be 
proclaimed from the house-tops.” For years there has 
been a feeling that the law must afford some remedy for 
the unauthorized circulation of portraits of private 
persons; and the evil of the invasion of privacy by the 
newspapers, long keenly felt, has been but recently 
discussed by an able writer.8 
We still struggle with the privacy issues of taking image 
photography, with social media acting as today’s version of the snap 
camera.9 At the outset of the technology and privacy debate, 
despite Brandeis’s eloquent advocacy for protection of the 
individual, courts did not immediately recognize a right to privacy 
that would have prohibited or limited the use of image 
photography for news reporting. Courts have since examined 
privacy rights and defined them as discrete zones bound by the 
specific parameters of either a written or common law.10 
 
 8.  Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 195 (1890). 
 9.  See Jaikumar Vijayan, Profile Pics on Social Media Sites Pose Privacy Risks, 
Researcher Warns, COMPUTERWORLD (Aug. 5, 2011, 7:05 AM), http://www 
.computerworld.com/s/article/9218903 (discussing the risks associated with facial 
recognition use based on profile photos from Facebook and LinkedIn); see also 
Amy Webb, We Post Nothing About Our Daughter Online, SLATE.COM (Sept. 4, 2013, 
5:30 AM), available at LEXIS (advocating against posting photos of children on 
Facebook and other social media). 
 10.  The first Supreme Court decision to fully articulate the right to privacy 
was Griswold v. Connecticut, which held that the right to privacy included the right 
for married couples to use contraceptives. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, Justice 
Douglas, writing for the Court, explained that the guarantees in the Bill of Rights 
have “penumbras,” which must be read as creating zones of privacy. Id. at 484. 
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First 
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its 
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of 
peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. 
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ‘right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy 
which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. 
The Ninth Amendment provides: ‘The enumeration in the  
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Taking a leap forward, one has to wonder what Chief Justice 
Brandeis might have written about the panoramic photographs and 
“payload data” by Google as the company developed its Street View 
feature to complement the Google Maps service. The court case 
that grew out of Google’s collection of payload data is but one 
example of the difficult task courts face in balancing the benefits 
and the vulnerabilities of technology—in the case of Google Maps, 
the convenience of an essential web feature and smartphone 
applications versus the excesses of massive data collection the 
company conducted to create Street View. 
Street View, which needs little introduction, provides 
panoramic, street-level photographs that have been captured by 
cameras mounted on vehicles that drive on public roads and 
photograph everything (including, initially, many surprised faces). 
The story could have ended there, but the data collection 
opportunity associated with the vehicles driving through every 
neighborhood in the country was not lost on Google’s engineers. 
In addition to the cameras, Google equipped the vehicles with 
Wi-Fi antennas and software that collected data transmitted by 
Wi-Fi networks in nearby homes and businesses.11 The equipment 
recorded both basic, innocuous information about the Wi-Fi 
networks it detected, such as signal strength, as well as so-called 
“payload data.” The payload data included personal emails, 
usernames, passwords, videos and documents, and other 
information sent over unencrypted home Wi-Fi networks that the 
vehicles detected.12 
When Google was famously sued for this practice, it seemed 
clear, at least from the perspective of societal privacy expectations, 
that the collection of the payload data was inconsistent with the 
desire to be “let alone.”13 Criticism of Google’s actions has been 
 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.’ 
Id. This conclusion was reached despite the fact that the word “privacy” does not 
appear even once in the U.S. Constitution.  
 11.  Joffe v. Google, Inc., No. 11-17483, 2013 WL 6905957, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 
27, 2013) (amending Joffe v. Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2013) and 
granting rehearing). 
 12.  Id. at *1–2. 
 13.  See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (“[The makers of our Constitution] sought to protect Americans in 
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, 
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swift and far reaching.14 Courts, however, had to decide if this 
practice was also illegal—specifically, in relation to the Federal 
Wiretap Act.15 The outcome of that analysis was not as immediately 
certain, as the case presented a novel question of statutory 
interpretation. The Federal Wiretap Act was amended in 1968 to 
extend the restrictions on phone tapping to tapping of electronic 
communications,16 at least ten years before the Internet and web 
browsers began making significant appearances in the consumer 
market. 
Google’s argument was that payload data was exempt from the 
general wiretapping prohibition—specifically, under an exemption 
for “radio communications” and another one for other “electronic 
communications” that are “readily accessible to the general 
public.”17 Google asserted that the payload data it collected met 
one or both of the exceptions because unscrambled and 
 
as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of 
rights, and the right most valued by civilized men.”).  
 14.  See Catherine Bolsover, German Foreign Minister Joins Criticism 
of Google’s Mapping Program, DW (Aug. 14, 2010), http://www.dw.de 
/german-foreign-minister-joins-criticism-of-googles-mapping-program/a-5910738-1 
(describing opposition by the German Foreign Minister to Google’s Street View 
service); Call to ‘Shut Down’ Street View, BBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7959362.stm (detailing complaints filed 
by Privacy International to the Information Commissioner); Elinor Mills, Google’s 
Street-Level Maps Raising Privacy Concerns, USA TODAY (June 4, 2007, 11:53 AM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy/2007-06-01-google 
-maps-privacy_N.htm (characterizing Street View as a threat to an individual’s 
privacy). 
 15.  Individuals whose data had been collected filed class action lawsuits 
against Google under the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012), California 
Business and Professions Code section 17200, and various state wiretap statutes. 
The cases were consolidated and assigned to the Northern District of California. 
See In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (N.D. 
Cal. 2011), aff'd sub nom. Joffe, 2013 WL 6905957. Google responded by filing a 
motion to dismiss, stating that its collection of payload data did not fall within the 
scope of the Wiretap Act’s prohibition of the interception of electronic 
communications. Id. at 1084. The district court denied Google’s motion. Id. At 
Google’s request, the district court certified the question for an interlocutory 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Joffe, 2013 WL 6905957, at *2. 
 16.  Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 
Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510−2522 (2012)). 
 17.  Joffe, 2013 WL 6905957, at *2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i)). 
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unencrypted Wi-Fi signals were electronic “radio communications” 
that anyone—not just Google—could intercept.18 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Google’s position 
and affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss Google’s 
motion.19 The court of appeals disagreed with both of Google’s 
arguments. Although the Federal Wiretap Act does not define 
“radio communications,” the court held that the plain meaning of 
that term excludes data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network.20 The 
Ninth Circuit concluded that, for purposes of the Federal Wiretap 
Act, a “radio communication” is a predominantly auditory 
broadcast, and does not include other types of signals transmitted 
over radio waves (e.g., Wi-Fi signals).21 The court rejected Google’s 
argument that payload data was “readily accessible to the general 
public.”22 While it acknowledged that Google was able to intercept 
payload data transmitted over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network, the 
court was not convinced that this fact made the data “readily 
accessible” for purposes of the exceptions contained in the Federal 
Wiretap Act.23 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision on the meaning of the Federal 
Wiretap Act exemptions could have gone either way and is a prime 
example of the challenge courts face in benchmarking modern 
technology against older laws passed before the technology existed 
or was well known. At the time the Federal Wiretap Law was passed, 
most people lacked the ability to communicate by email, let alone 
intercept that communication with a passing vehicle. Use of radio 
waves was largely limited to audible communications, which could 
be intercepted by an amateur radio hobbyist. The court concluded 
that it was not foreseeable when the Federal Wiretap Act was passed 
that a radio hobbyist or anyone else would use technology to 
intercept payload data, such as emails containing personal 
 
 18.  Id. at *2, *5. Google’s arguments focused on the specific language in the 
Wiretap Act exempting “radio communications” that were “readily accessible to 
the general public.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i). 
 19.  Joffe, 2013 WL 6905957, at *5. 
 20.  Id. at *6. 
 21.  Id. at *7. 
 22.  Id. at *5. 
 23.  Id. at *9 (noting that traditional radio services can be easily and 
mistakenly intercepted by radio hobbyists, but that radio hobbyists “do not 
mistakenly use packet sniffers to intercept payload data transmitted on Wi-Fi 
networks”). 
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information exchanged between an individual and their “doctor, 
lawyer, accountant, priest or spouse,” or communications from an 
unencrypted Wi-Fi network operated by a police department.24 
Accordingly, the law’s exemption was inapplicable to this 
application of newer technology. 
The Google decision is only one example of how the legal 
system addresses issues inherent to evolving technology, and one 
that may well be quickly rendered obsolete by the pace of this 
evolution. While we may be unable to envision at this time all of the 
technology innovations to come, we can reasonably predict that its 
advancement will continue to challenge the meaning of the 
Federal Wiretap Act and many other laws—whether formal 
discovery rules or the statutes that seek to govern technology and 
its byproducts. Keeping this uncertainty in mind, the authors of this 
volume bravely take on the challenge to provide guidance on a 
cross section of legal requirements and technologies that challenge 
the legal status quo, such as the always-critical e-discovery, legal 
issues arising from Google’s extraction and use of individual user 
data, mobile payments, and cyber warfare. 
By the time this volume is published, there will be new NSA 
revelations, even newer technology, and a host of new privacy and 
security risks that we have not yet considered. But the importance 
of being current on these requirements cannot be overstated. As I 
am finishing this foreword, my mind begins to shift gears in 
anticipation of watching the last episode of the critically acclaimed 
TV show Breaking Bad. Had I not seen the entire run of the show, 
this last episode—which I know will be memorable—would be lost 
on me; I would neither enjoy it nor understand it. So when the 
“new episode” of technology developments comes along, the great 
work the authors have done here will have taken you through the 
prior “seasons” and given you the tools to comprehend and digest 
the legal implications of whatever awaits us. 
 
 
 24.  Id.  
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